In this study, we provide the conditions for efficient provision of a public good in a participation game in which a non-negative integer number of units of the public good can be provided. In the case in which at most one unit of the public good can be provided, we provide refinements of Nash equilibria at which agents choose only a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and provide sufficient conditions for cost-sharing rules that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation. In the case of a multi-unit public good, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and prove that Nash equilibria are less likely to support efficient allocations if the participation of many agents is needed for efficient provision of the public good in the case of identical agents.
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However, implementation theory assumes that all agents participate, and each agent lacks the right to determine whether or not to participate in the mechanism. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) , Saijo and Yamato (1999) , and Dixit and Olson (2000) pointed out the importance of the strategic behavior of agents as they decide whether or not to participate in the mechanism. In the real world, e.g., in participation problems for international environmental treaties, agents often have the right to make such decisions, and they may have an incentive not to enter the mechanism, hoping that other agents will participate in the mechanism and provide a public good. This behavior generates another kind of a free-rider problem.
These authors formulated a participation game for a public good mechanism. In the game, each agent simultaneously chooses whether or not to participate in the mechanism. If an agent chooses to participate, he pays the fee requested by the mechanism, and the public good is produced. If an agent chooses not to participate, he can enjoy the public good at no cost. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Dixit and Olson (2000) analyzed the participation game for the case in which a public good can be produced in integer units and, at most, one unit of public good is produced, which is called a participation game with a public project hereafter. Saijo and Yamato (1999) examined a participation game with a perfectly divisible public good.
In this paper, we examine the conditions for efficient provision of a public good in a participation game when a non-negative integer number of units of the public good can be provided. First, in the participation game with a public project, we examine which types of agents' behavior achieve allocative efficiency in non-cooperative environments. Although the standard solution for non-cooperative games is the Nash equilibrium, it is well known that the participation game with a public project has many Nash equilibria and both efficient allocations and inefficient allocations are supported as Nash equilibria. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) pointed out that efficient provision, underprovision, and overprovision of a public good are possible at pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria and that early experimental results reporting overprovision of a public good may be consistent with self-interested Nash behavior. Dixit and Olson (2000) focused on mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and argued that underprovision of a public good at the mixed-strategy equilibria undermines the Coase Theorem. However, earlier studies have not investigated which types of Nash equilibria achieve efficient allocations. In this paper, we provide refinements of Nash equilibria that support efficient allocations and investigate which behavioral assumptions ensure efficient provision of the public good, in addition to the Nash behavioral principle.
Second, in a participation game with a public project, we investigate which cost-sharing rules guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria that support efficient allocations. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Dixit and Olson (2000) assumed that participants share the cost of the project equally. Under this equal cost-sharing rule, if agents' preferences are identical, then the participation game has a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation. However, under this rule, when agents' preferences are heterogeneous, a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation does not necessarily exist. On the other hand, as is shown in this paper, an equilibrium with an efficient
